In this paper, we analyze exits from longterm sickness spells in Sweden. Using data for more than 2,500 people, the aim is to analyze the transition to different states: return to work, full disability pension, partial disability pension, and other exits from the labor force. Given the complexity of the exit decision, which encompasses both the individual's choice, the medical evaluation and the decision of the insurance adjudicator, we consider the outcome as being the result of two aspects of the exit process: one that governs the duration of a spell prior to the decision to exit, and another that governs the type of exit. Therefore, the analysis is done in two steps: first, we analyze the duration of the sickness spells, and then we analyze the process that governs the type of exit. The results indicate that both individual characteristics and push factors, such as regional unemployment, are important for both components of the decision process.
Introduction
Long-term absenteeism due to sickness has been increasing in Sweden during the past two decades, raising many questions about causes, financing, and policy measures to prevent further increases. The extent to which increased absence due to sickness is attributable to changes in actual or perceived poor health among the employed is not easy to determine. Additionally, it cannot be ruled out that in the long term a change in the level of absence may be due to changing attitudes and values with regard to reporting sick. However, due to the generosity of the social insurance system, which allows people to leave the labor market permanently or temporarily, sicknessspell indicators probably do not give an accurate image of the average health of either the Swedish population or the working-age population.
Even though it is expected that investment in health (especially maintaining a good diet, exercising, etc.) drives the path of choices available to people, the question is how long does a person wait until choosing to leave the labor market, and then what path does she or he choose? The empirical literature on labor-market participation, explaining whether or not people work in general, is vast, but there is relatively little research focused on disability exits per se. 1 The effects of health on labor-market participation are theoretically ambiguous, although most research seems to assume that poor health will decrease participation. Little consensus on the magnitude of the effects has been reached, mainly due to different definitions of health. Until the late 1980s most of the literature on labor-market participation concentrated on factors that influence the number of hours worked, but few studies attempted to distinguish different nonworking states, such as unemployment, long-term sickness, disability, or early retirement for other reasons. Those studies that have focused on transitions between states have mainly examined the transition to and from unemployment. Nevertheless, there is an emerging genre of literature focusing on retirement decisions of the older labor force, and there is also quite a vast literature regarding the labor-force participation of older workers. 2 The literature on labor-force participation in Sweden contains some studies that found that rule changes have a significant effect on sickness absenteeism (e.g., [1-3, 9, 10, 13-18, 22] ).Given the complexity of the decision to exit the labor market, which encompasses both the individual's choice, the medical evaluation, and the decision of the insurance adjudicator, this study considers the outcome as being the result of two aspects of the exit processes: one that governs the duration of a spell prior the decision to exit, and another that governs the type of exit. Therefore, we analyze both the spells of sickness, and the exit from sickness, aiming to estimate both the effects of observables on the duration of sickness absences, and the effects of observables on the probability of exiting to a given state (return to work, full disability, partial disability, and other exits). We use Swedish data for the period 1983-1991. Given that Sweden is the only country in the European Union that has no official upper limit on how long a person may receive sickness benefits, while most of the other countries have a 52-week limit, some of the results might suggest which factors could affect the exit from and the length of sickness absence if an upper limit were enacted.
Social insurance during the study period
All residents in Sweden with an estimated annual earned income, from either employment or selfemployment, of at least 6,000 Swedish crowns (during the period analyzed by this study) are covered by the national insurance regulations on cash benefits during illness or injury. 3 Those entitled to use the Swedish health services at subsidized prices include all residents of Sweden regardless of nationality, as well as patients seeking emergency attention from EU/EEA countries and some other countries with which Sweden has a special convention. A sickness benefit (sick-pay) is available for an unlimited period when an illness reduces working capacity by at least 25%. During the 1980s and 1990s, social-insurance rules changed largely in response to economic developments, with expansion during the good years, and cut backs in bad times. During the period studied (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , there were two main changes which took effect 1 December 1987 and 1 March 1991. The first change followed an economic expansion in the middle of the 1980s when the national economy grew at a relatively rapid rate, and unemployment was the lowest since the mid-1970s. From December 1, 1987 sickness insurance began to cover the loss of earnings from the first day the illness was reported; previously there had been an unpaid 1-day waiting period. The second change took place in 1991, the year when Sweden began a recession period. The replacement rate for the sickness benefit had been 90% from the first day since December 1987, but from 1 March 1991, this replacement rate was not in effect until after the 90th day of the sickness spell. Only 65% was then paid for the first 3 days of the sickness spell, and 80% from then through the 90th day. 4 However, most workers also received another 10% from negotiated benefits (i.e., paid directly by their employer, not by the social-insurance system), which meant that, for them, the greatest difference was during the first 3 days.
Reduced working capacity and labor-market participation
The supply of labor Health status may affect the labor supply decision by changing the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Poor health or injury increases the disutility from work and creates incentives for leaving the labor market temporarily or permanently, since it makes leisure more valuable relative to work. What consumers demand when they purchase medical and/or health services are not these services per se but rather better health. Therefore, when consumers make a decision to buy such services, they want to invest in their health capital, that is they want to improve their health, or they feel a need to invest in order to maintain it at a level that allows a ''normal'' existence (e.g., being able to meet all daily biological needs without help).
Mushkin [20] , Becker [5] , and Fuchs [11] pointed out that health capital is one component of human capital. Human capital is the attributes of a person that are productive in some economic context. It often refers to formal educational attainment, with the implication that education is an investment whose returns are in the form of wage, salary, or other compensation. According to human-capital theory [5, 6, 7, 19] , increases in a person's human capital raise their productivity both in the market sector of the economy (where they produce money earnings) and in the household sector (where they produce commodities that enter their utility function).
Human capital is typically acquired at different rates over the working career. For earnings to rise in early years, relatively more capital must be acquired, and if the earnings profile is then to turn downward, as statistical evidence suggests, relatively less capital must be acquired later. If people invest in human capital at a decreasing rate as they age, then their total stock of human capital will also increase at a slower rate, or even decrease, due to ''depreciation.'' In order to maintain a given level of earnings, acquisitions of job knowledge must at least equal this depreciation. For many, this may simply mean keeping up through ''learning by doing'' daily tasks on the job. For others, who might be stuck in a ''fixed'' technology, i.e., with little ''learning by doing'' renewal opportunities, the situation might be worse and earnings could stagnate or even decline as they age. They would certainly decline in a free labor-market setting where hourly earnings are related to productivity.
This interpretation of the theory suggests that persons with lengthy spells of sickness, even if they become completely well afterwards, will lose some job experience, and may lose some relative job productivity. On the other hand, people with sickness whose human capital is low (highly depreciated) might find long-term sickness leading to disability to be a way out of the predicament. Certainly, long periods of sickness can deplete workplace-specific capital, as the dynamics of the workplace continue. The seriousness of these problems will depend on individual characteristics, the length of sickness and the requirements of the job. Persons with jobs requiring a lower level of skills or less ongoing technical training would experience less serious problems than would persons with jobs requiring more. Also, the effort, and associated costs, to the individual to recapture a training loss will by definition be greater the higher are the demands of the job.
Because of sickness, an individual's capacity may thus be temporarily or permanently reduced, at least vis à vis a specific work task. This suggests a decline in productivity with a given human-capital profile, or technically speaking, what we might call extra humancapital depreciation. Reduced earnings capacity due to sickness may or may not qualify the individual for a partial disability benefit, depending on the socialinsurance legislation in a country and how it is applied in practice. In addition, the medical condition may only be temporary, in which case the individual may not want to apply for disability benefit.
Changing employers is easier in a tight labor market than in a labor market with high unemployment and few new openings, and it is also easier the larger the local job market is. There are other considerations to changing employers, however, among them the total cost for the family. An overall household calculation might show that the most desirable alternative is to stay put in a situation with lower earnings potential because it costs something to search for a new job, it costs to move, and it may be difficult for a spouse to get his or her reservation earnings in another location.
Changing occupations usually involves an even higher cost, and probably a more uncertain outcome, the older one is. In addition, the older one is, the fewer are the remaining years of benefits to be reaped from a given investment in training/education. This, together with the other disadvantages listed above, might weight the calculation in favor of not moving.
The demand for labor
Individual earnings are a result of supply as well as demand. In a competitive market, profit-maximizing employers will seek out employees whose human capital best suits the requirements of a job at the lowest cost. Given this perspective, employers have no reason to discriminate against persons who have been sick, as long as their human capital is not perceived as being impaired. In fact, human capital may in part be employer or even employer-task specific, rather than general, which means that there are hiring and training costs associated with acquiring new employees. In this case, it is also costly to lay off persons if their only problem is that they are temporarily sick.
If the normal situation is that sickness does not impair human capital or work capacity, and if future performance and/or sickness is not normally a function of past sickness, then (ceteris paribus) we should not be able to observe differences between the earnings of persons with lengthy sickness history and those persons without [4] .
So long as there is no rational reason for wage differences between persons with a history of sickness and others (i.e., due to reduced productivity per hour, or reduced capacity to work a normal number of hours), or to increased inconvenience costs, then any observed differences would be due to discrimination. However, if sickness is normally a function of past sickness, i.e., if there are ''sick'' people and ''healthy'' people, then employers might be expected to offer lower wages to the ''sick'' people, because absenteeism does create costs for the employer, through inconvenience (and lower overall productivity) at the workplace. Then cost-conscious employers, behaving rationally, would take this increased risk into account when establishing pay rates.
Labor-market participation
We have some means at our disposal for testing whether effects originate from supply or demand. Decreased hours of work after sickness would be a supply effect, as this would be a decision that rests with the individual. Transition into partial-or full-disability status is also a clear supply effect. Given the institutional settings, the exit alternatives from a spell of long-term sickness for persons younger than 65 are return to work, temporary or permanent exit with full or partial disability, and other non-working exits (e.g., unemployment, emigration or return to the home country).
The sickness benefit is available for an unlimited period, and given the medical evaluation, the patient can choose the exit alternative that maximizes his or her utility. Given the requirement of a medical evaluation, the patient's final decision does not look as if it is a choice. Nevertheless, following the medical evaluation, the doctor can suggest different alternatives, but the employee is the one who really decides. There are people who prefer to work even though they have the opportunity to leave the labor market with a disability benefit. The real problem is the difficulty in adapting a work environment or finding a proper job for their health status.
Data
The data analyzed came from the Long-term Sickness (LS) database of the Swedish National Social Insurance Board [21, 23] . A random sample (LSIP) was used, representing all residents in Sweden registered with the social-insurance office born during who had had at least one sickness spell of at least 60 days during the period 1986-1989. The LSIP sample contains information on 2,666 individuals and their sickness history during 1983-1991. Some people had only one spell of sickness absence of at least 60 days during 1986-1991, while other people had several spells of sickness. For all sickness spells, the exact starting dates are known, so the analyzed spells are not leftcensored, but the sickness history data are left-truncated before 1983. At the end of the observation period (31 December 1991), some people continued to be sick, so these spells are right-censored. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the first spells by exit type.
The majority (about 76%) returned to work, while the rest either exited into full disability, partial disability, or other (non-working) statuses. As expected, people who exited into disability (both full and partial) had longer spells (more than 600 days) than those who returned to work (109 days). Descriptive statistics of the data by individual are presented in the Appendix (Table 4) .
The results
All the individuals studied here were sick for at least 60 days. The duration of absence as well as the exit is one of the outcomes of a medical examination. There is no standard duration for most diagnoses, and even if there is a norm, individual cases can vary greatly around this norm. The determinant for receiving a benefit is reduced work capacity, which also depends on the work situation. On top of this, it is the individual who must relate to the doctor how he or she feels, and this is obviously a subjective measure. A natural way to depict this process is first to estimate a model for the timing of the events, and then to estimate a (second) model for the type of event. For the timing of events, we estimate a competing-risks model, while for the type of event we estimate a multinomial logit.
5 Figure 1 shows the log-log survival functions for all exit types over time, without covariates. For all types of exits, more than 80% of the spells ended before the third year. The curve for return to work is always the highest, while the curve for exit to partial disability is much lower than the other three curves during the first 2 years. For more information, we also examined the smoothed-hazard plots (Fig. 2) . The hazard for return to work drops rapidly during the first 420 days of sickness, and fluctuates for the rest of the period, while the hazard for full-disability exit increases during the first 600 days. This means that, excepting the relationship between full and partial disability, we should reject the proportionality hypothesis. Table 2 presents the estimates of the competing-risks model. The age group of 56-65 years, earnings, earnings loss and the year dummies 1986 and 1987 are the only variables that were statistically significant at the 10% level for all types of exit. Other variables (i.e., the other two age-group dummies, the educational-level dummies, regional unemployment rate, the other year dummies, and some diagnosis dummies) were significant for some exit types, while others (i.e., naturalized Swede, and respiratory-diagnoses dummies) were not significant for any of the exit types. Excepting the exit into partial disability, the gender effect was significant for all other type of exits, and indicates that women had shorter spells than men for both return to work, and exit into full disability, but they had longer spells than men for ''other exits.'' The age effect differed across exit types: compared to the youngest age group (i.e., younger than 36 years), employees in all other age groups had longer spells of sickness before returning to work or exiting into full disability, while those who exited into partial disability had shorter spells when they were older than 55.
Excepting both types of exit into disability, married people had shorter spells than those with another marital status. This could reflect financial pressure if they are the only income earners in the family, or if both incomes are needed. It is also possible that married persons are healthier on average.
Those with higher earnings returned to work faster than the other employees, but they had longer spells before full disability and ''other exits.'' Those with higher education who exited into full disability, and those with medium or higher education who returned to work had shorter spells of sickness than those with a lower level of education. Those with medium or higher education leaving with an ''other exit'' had longer spells than those with lower education.
Excepting the disability exits, for all other exit types, higher unemployment rates at the level of the regional social-insurance office implied longer spells of sickness, which could be related both to unemployment fear, or its impact on health status. A multinomial model was estimated for the whole sample of the first spell of long-term sickness. 6 Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of the multinomial model of exits from long-term sickness, the relativerisk ratios, 7 and the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of a given exit from the sickness spell. Unlike the analysis of the competingrisks model, for which the impact of the explanatory variable was estimated for each exit type, now they were estimated using ''return to work'' as the reference category against other response categories (full disability, partial disability, and other exits).
Compared to men, women had a lower probability of exiting into full disability and other exits than of returning to work. The older people were, the higher was the probability that they would exit to either full or partial disability instead of returning to work. Foreigners exited into full disability more often than did Swedish-born people. People with medium or higher education had a lower probability of exiting than did those with lower education.
The effect of economic incentives on estimating the probability of choosing another exit than return to work is estimated by using two variables: earnings (i.e., annual work income) at the beginning of each sickness spell, and earnings loss related to the sickness spell. Earnings appear to have been important, as the likelihood of exiting to a non-working state was lower for higher-income earners. On the other hand, the estimated parameter for the loss in earnings (that is an interaction variable) has a positive sign, which suggests that the likelihood of choosing a non-working state increased with the level of the loss of earnings. This variable was computed as a function of expected annual earnings if people were to work as scheduled, the ceiling level for compensation, replacement rate, and compensated days of sickness; it can take the same value for a high-income earner with not necessarily very long spells of sickness, and a low-income earner with a very long spell of sickness. The relationship between the number of sickness days and the loss of earnings due to (this) sickness was linear, but because of the benefit ceiling, people with high earnings lost more than did those with low earnings for the same duration.
The nonparametric analysis suggested that the average duration of the analyzed spells of long-term sickness differed across the exits. The multinomial estimates of duration dummies show that the more days of sickness people experienced, the higher was the probability of another exit than returning to work. The year when people started their sickness spell also had a significant effect on the exit type, which might be explained by events not captured by other variables. The diagnosis also had a significant effect on people's exits. Comparing to the musculoskeletal group, people with a mental diagnosis had a higher probability of exit into full disability instead of returning to work, while those with injuries or poisoning had a lower probability.
Summary and conclusions
This study analyses both the duration of long-term sickness absences and the exits from sickness spells, using the Swedish National Insurance Board's LS data for the period 1983-1991. The mean duration of all spells was about 10 months (306 days). About 76% of all persons returned to work after an average sickness absence of about 6 months (180 days), while about 13% of them exited into full disability after an average absence of almost 2 years (712 days). The exits from long-term sickness were analyzed by using both duration analysis and a multiple-choice framework. This analysis in two steps was suggested by the complexity of the exit decision, which implies, in a very simplified framework, at least two aspects of the exit process: one that governs the duration of the sickness spell and another that governs the type of exit. The results indicate that both individual characteristics and push factors, such as regional unemployment, were important for the final output, and their effects on the two analyzed aspects are not always the same. For example, compared to men, women who exit the labor market with a full or partial disability pension have longer spells, but they have a lower probability of choosing these exits than of returning to work. Those who exit the labor market with another exit have shorter spells, and a lower probability of choosing this exit than of returning to work. 6 Using Hausman's test for independence of irrelevant alternatives, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected ( Table 5 in the Appendix). This means that, given any particular observation, the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives of the response variable is not systematically influenced by other alternatives. 7 The relative-risk ratios report the exponentiated value of the coefficient, exp(b). If the relative risk is r, and returning to work is the reference category, this means that the relative risk of the exit j over return-to-work ratio is r for cases when a dummy variable takes value 1 relative to cases with zero value; or r for one-unit change in a continuous variable. Then, the likelihood of choosing a non-working exit (full disability, partial disability, or other exit) can then be compared with that of returning to work.
Compared to younger people, older people who exit the labor market with a full disability pension have shorter spells, but they have a higher probability of choosing this exit than of returning to work. Those who exit the labor market with a partial disability pension have longer spells, and they have a lower probability of choosing this exit than of returning to work.
Compared to natives, foreign-born and naturalized Swedes who exit the labor market with a full disability pension have longer spells, and a higher probability of choosing this exit than of returning to work. Those who exit the labor market with a partial disability pension have shorter spells, and they have a lower probability of choosing this exit than of returning to work.
Summing together the results of this study with previous findings and the theoretical foundation, it appears that policy measures should consider differences in the conditions and circumstances of different groups such as men and women, younger and older employees, etc. The medical examination is clearly a very important element in this whole process, but even more so regarding the future of employed individuals. Having a well-done evaluation and flexible programs connected to it can help the individual's health and wealth, and society too. Nevertheless, being active in a ''well-balanced'' way is considered to have a positive impact on health, especially in the long run. Therefore, it might be useful to have access to health evaluations done by company doctors and/or for doctors to be more informed about the working conditions and job requirements of their patients. Given that Sweden is the only country in the European Union that has no official upper limit to how long a person may receive sickness benefits, it seems that if an upper limit were enacted, the policies should take into consideration at least the age and gender aspects. Nevertheless, given the relatively high proportion of people who exit with a full disability pension after almost 2 years of absence, it seems that rehabilitation and/or other active policies should be used much earlier. Another result that should be taken into consideration in a broader perspective of the socialinsurance system (pension, parental leave, etc.) is that compared to men, women who exit the labor market with a full or partial disability pension have longer spells, but they have a lower probability of choosing these exits than of returning to work. Given the setting of the pension system, women might choose to return to work, but this does not imply that they will not end up again in one or more spells of sickness absence and/ or disability pension.
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